Denver Journal of International Law & Policy
Volume 34
Number 3 Fall

Article 4

January 2007

The Multi-State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Todd Howland

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp

Recommended Citation
Todd Howland, The Multi-State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 35 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 389 (2007).

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,digcommons@du.edu.

THE MULTI-STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL
VIOLATIONS OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS*

TODD HOWLAND**

"At some point in the development of every legalsystem, the originalstrict
andformal applicationof rules is supplemented by afreer approach which aims to
go beyond the positivist strictures.

I. INTRODUCTION
This article argues for a change of perspective in the enterprise of promoting
and protecting human rights. Long the province of the relationship of individual
citizens to their state, this article goes beyond the present trends related to human
rights obligations of non-state actors and its extraterritorial application. This
article posits that multiple states can and do hold legal responsibility to protect and
promote the human rights of the same individual.
The idea that multiple states have human rights obligations to the same
individual is derived, in part, from the author's own experience working in "failed
states" and as part of multilateral efforts to bring peace, respect for human rights,
and stability to war-tom and dysfunctional countries. Often the resources (e.g.,
power and financial capacity) at the disposal of the "host state" were extremely
limited, while the United Nations Member States choosing to intervene in that
country, either bilaterally and/or multilaterally, had extensive resources and at
times more political power than the host country.
Oddly, considering legal developments in other fields and the nature of
human rights, there is a continuing practice of placing all legal obligations for
violations of human rights on the country where such violations occur. Those
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* This article was originally given as a speech during the 2006 Sutton Colloquium, which was held at
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states that have voluntarily joined in efforts to rehabilitate failed states have
enjoyed total impunity. This impunity is enjoyed regardless of the relative power
and financial capacity brought to bear in what these states would call a collective
endeavor to bring peace, the respect for human rights and stability to war torn and
dysfunctional countries. 2
Most relevant to development of the theory presented in this article is the
author's recent work related to Haiti. Thus, the article begins with contextual
information about Haiti.
It continues with a discussion of theoretical
considerations regarding the multi-state responsibility for extraterritorial violations
of economic and social rights.
This discussion first addresses historic
humanitarian purposes, intervention industry reality, 3 the essence of human rights
law, the legal concept that sovereignty is not jurisdiction, the criminal and civil
nature of human rights law, and voluntarily assumed legal obligations. These
theoretical considerations will then ground a discussion of specific hurdles to
achieving multi-state responsibility for extraterritorial violations of economic and
social rights, including marginalization of economic and social rights, exterritorial
application of human rights law and multi-state responsibility. The article will
conclude with a policy suggestion.
II. How RECENT

EXPERIENCE IN HAITI INFORMS THE ARGUMENT

Every year, the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial bestows its Human Rights
Award on a creative and courageous activist. 4 During the period when the author
directed the Memorial's Center for Human Rights, the Center committed to
working for many years with the recipient to help her or him achieve specific

2. In fact, the United Nations was founded for this reason. See, e.g., U.N. Charter pmbl.
We the Peoples of the United Nations Determinedto save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow
to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations
large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for
the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be
maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom, And for these Ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace with
one another as good neighbors, and to unite our strength to maintain international
peace and security, and to ensure by the acceptance of principles and the
institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common
interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the
economic and social advancement of all peoples, Have Resolved to Combine our
Efforts to Accomplish these Aims Accordingly, our respective Governments,
through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have
exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the
present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international
organization to be known as the United Nations.
3. Considering the cost and frequency of military, peacekeeping, humanitarian and development
interventions, they have become an industry.
4. Robert F. Kennedy Memorial,
http://www.rfkmemorial.org/legacyinaction/humanrightsawardadvocacy/ (last visited April 20, 2007).
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human rights changes. In 2002, Loune Viaud, a right to health activist from Haiti,
won the award.
After the ouster of President Aristide in February 2004' Viaud was skeptical
about the new transitional government, 6 although she was hopeful that this
international intervention, the 5th UN peacekeeping operation to Haiti, 7 would
become more engaged in and supportive of development in Haiti than past
missions. She was skeptical about the change because her organization had
developed a number of projects implemented with the Aristide government that
were measurably improving access to health care and had a positive impact on the
AIDS crisis in the country. In fact, this was one of the reasons why she won the
award. After Aristide's ouster, however, programs such as these, run jointly with
the new government, were negatively impacted.
Haiti was considered a "failed state" and had a temporary or interim
administration that was established extra-constitutionally with a good deal of
support, cajoling, arm-twisting, and imposition by important states such as the
United States. Much against the council of experience and of experts, the US
militarily intervened to facilitate Aristide's removal and the "restoration" of order
when regional actors were against the idea and most favored preventive measures. 8
The US obtained UN Security Council support for the US led "multinational
interim force" intervention and quickly turned the intervention over to the UN. 9
The Member States voluntarily intervening in Haiti, acting bilaterally and
collectively, were better resourced and arguably may have exerted more influence
over the country's direction than those nominally running the transitional
government. But what is key here is that power and resources were brought to
bear by various Member States to achieve a common objective: to bring peace,
respect for human rights and stability. They brought resources that were much
greater than those of the Government of Haiti. 10

5. President Aristide had been deposed once before. In fact, Haiti never had a democratic
transition until 1994, when President Aristide handed power over to Rene Preval, who won the
Presidential vote. Aristide was barred from running for a second consecutive term, but was elected
again in 2001 in the context of growing instability. See, e.g., Paul Farmer, Haiti's Wretched of the
Earth, T1KKUN MAGAZINE, May-June 2004; Walt Bogdanich & Jenny Nordberg, Democracy Undone Mixed U.S. Signals Help Tilt Haiti to Chaos,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at Al.
6. The Transitional Government was a disappointment from a traditional human rights
perspective as well. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, Amnesty International Report 2005:The State of the
World's Human Rights, Haiti section, Al index POL 10/001/2005, May 25, 2005, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/hti-summary-eng.
7. See S.C. Res. 1542, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1542 (April 30, 2004); See generally, United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti, http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/minustah/index.html (last visited
April 23, 2007).
8. US interventions in failed states have basically been failures and should be used rarely as
opposed to as a tool invoked without trying many alternatives. See, e.g., Anatol Lieven, FailingStates
and
US
Policy,
Sept.
2006,
Stanley
Found.
Pol'y
Brief.
available at
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/pab06failingstates.pdf.
9. S.C. Res. 1529, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1529 (Feb. 29, 2004).
10. Todd Howland, Peacekeeping and Conformity with Human Rights Law - How MINUSTAH
Falls Short in Haiti, 13 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 462, 470 (2006).
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Haiti is not the exception. The author has seen the problem first hand while
working with the UN in post-genocide Rwanda, where those participating in the
international intervention were much better resourced than the post-genocide
government. When the author arrived in Rwanda, the Ministry of Justice, tasked
with responding to the genocide, had almost no resources. Most of the
infrastructure of the Ministry had been destroyed. The only vehicle the Ministry
had was the Minister's old worn out private car, which on most days needed to be
push started. Situations vary in terms of relative resource capacity and political
power, but every country in crisis with an international intervention shares some of
the same characteristics. In the absence of a war, a ceasefire, a peace process, or a
peace accord, the UN Stabilization Mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH)" was an
especially clear example of a relatively well-resourced peacekeeping mission sent
to a country with extreme poverty and a long history of bad governance.
A few months after the UN established a peacekeeping operation in Haiti,
Loune Viaud would call the author and complain that "the UN was in Haiti on
vacation" or that the donors say they have pledged over a billion dollars, but that
she saw no visible impact from this money and questioned if any had actually been
disbursed. 12 Given she runs one of the largest NGOs in Haiti, if she and her staff
are unaware of the positive impact there probably was none. Viaud became more
and more outraged at the fact that the UN had taken over Haiti's only medical
school for its troops. The UN troops had electricity, running water and transport,
but Haitian communities did not. She would call and complain that kids were
lining up outside the UN compound to read because it was one of the few places in
town with good light at night. Research done at that time by the RFK Memorial
Center for Human Rights demonstrated an enormous gap between significant

11. On April 30, 2004, the UN Security Council decided to establish the United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and requested that authority be transferred from the
Multinational Interim Force (MIF), authorized by the Security Council on February 29, 2004, to
MINUSTAH on June 1, 2004. See S.C. Res. 1542, supranote 7; S.C. Res. 1529, supranote 9.
12. Ms. Viaud's concern about lack of disbursement of promised funds was confirmed by research
conducted by the RFK Memorial Center for Human Rights in 2005 and early 2006. Much of the money
promised in the donor conferences had not been operationalized. See Interim Cooperation Framework,
Summary (April 2006) (unpublished study, on file with the Denver Journal of International Law and
Policy). The UN, through a recent high-level panel, has recognized that "the UN and its specialized
agencies have much to offer in the way of expertise, knowledge, resources and practical experience...
[b]ut the system is failing widely." They pointed to a lack of institutional effectiveness, cost efficiency
and focus. Poor governance, unpredictable funding, and outdated practices, as well as an often
fragmented and weak UN presence on the ground were also cited. The Panel blamed "policy
incoherence, program duplication, and vested interests in the status quo," with attempts by UN staff to
remedy the situation "thwarted by inappropriate administrative procedures, mediocre management and
ill-conceived loyalties." Shaukat Aziz, Luisa Dias Diogo & Jens Stoltenberg, Unifying the UN, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Nov. 8, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/l 1/08/opinion/edaziz.php;
See also The Secretary-General's High-Level Panel, Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level
Panel on UN System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, HumanitarianAssistance, and the
Environment: Delivering as One, delivered to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc A/61/583 (Nov. 9,
2006).
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pledges, their disbursement,13 and their operationalization. This research supports
Viaud's anecdotal account.
There was no hot war in Haiti, so it was unclear why the main response of the
UN Security Council was to send troops. Making change on the ground is no easy
task, 14 but sending the wrong tool does not make it any easier.
MINUSTAH's annual budget was larger than that of the Government of Haiti.
Larger. This is without considering other multilateral and bilateral support not
already part of the annual governmental revenue or loan stream, or the amounts
that come into Haiti which are not part of Government revenue. For example, the
US in 2004 and 2005 disbursed $352 million in assistance for Haiti; most of it
through US based NGOs. 15
The Haitian government had annual revenues of about US$400 million and
expenditures of about US$600 million in 2005,16 whereas the approved 2005
MINUSTAH budget was US$518.30 million. 17
Remarkably, an ally of former President Aristide, his former Prime Minister,8
was elected President a little more than two years following Aristide's ouster.'
His election brought about a reduction in political violence, which could indicate
that international intervention may have contributed to, as opposed to minimizing,
the political violence.
Viaud's complaint can be boiled down to the following:
Has the international intervention, with all its expenditures, actually
measurably improved the human rights situation in Haiti?
Her complaint begs the question: do those participating in the international
intervention collectively (e.g., as the UN or World Bank) and/or as individual
States actually have an obligation to spend monies allocated or design programs in
a way to consciously maximize their positive impact on the human rights situation?
This article sets out to demonstrate that the answer to this question is yes. At
present there is a gulf between those scholars who convincingly assert that such

13. Interim Cooperation Framework, Summary (April 2006) (unpublished study, on file with the
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy).
14. See DR. JAMAL BENOMAR, RULE OF LAW TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN HAITI: LESSONS
LEARNED, A World Bank Conference: "Empowerment, Security and Opportunity through Law and
available
at
Justice,"
St.
Petersburg,
Russia
(July
8-12,
2001)

http://haiticci.undg.org/uploads/Lessons%20Learned%2OJustice_.2001.pdf (discussing how to advance
reform in a political environment not conducive to change and characterized by protracted political
crisis and paralysis).
Jan.
2007,
15. U.S.
Dep't
of
State,
Background
Note:
Haiti,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1982.htm (last visited May 14, 2007).

16. The CIA World Factbook, Haiti, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ha.html
(last visited April 23, 2007).
17. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Revised Budget for the United
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haitifor the Periodfrom I July 2005 to 30 June 2006, U.N. Doe.

A/60/176 (Aug. 1, 2005).
18. Louis Aucoin, Haiti's ConstitutionalCrisis, 17 B.U. INT'L L.J. 115, 118 (1999).
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human rights obligations exist 19 and operational entities that seem to even
begrudge being bound by humanitarian law after a directive from the UN Secretary
General.20

III.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

As odd as it may sound, political and bureaucratic concerns trump human
rights obligations in the organization of international missions, mainly because
Member States and multilateral and bi-lateral bureaucrats do not consider
themselves bound by human rights law in the organization and operation of an
intervention.
How human rights obligations can more effectively organize mission
resources and hold accountable those involved in international interventions needs
to be better defined. For a variety of reasons, the questions "Who holds human
rights?" and "Who has the obligation to respect human rights?" are increasingly
complex.
A. HumanitarianPurposev. The Intervention Industry
Historically, linked to the work of the International Red Cross and the content
of humanitarian law or the rules of war, interventions with a humanitarian purpose
have developed a certain mystique. They enjoy international protection: not just
limited scrutiny, but affirmative privileges.
The problem is that interventions with an ostensible humanitarian purpose
now regularly include a full range of operations, from aid programs to sending
troops (known informally as "blue helmets"). 21 This complicates any effort to
hold individual states responsible, since a state may easily avoid scrutiny by
claiming a humanitarian purpose.22
In the International Court of Justice's consideration of the complaint by the
Nicaraguan government regarding the covert war the US was waging against it, the
ICJ even entertained the United States' argument that its activities in Nicaragua
should be considered of humanitarian nature and, therefore, legitimate. The ICJ
stated: "the provision of humanitarian aid cannot be regarded as an unlawful
intervention or in any way contrary to international law... if [implemented] to
avoid violations of sovereignty and limited to the purpose 'to prevent and alleviate

19. MARGOT SALOMON & ARiUN SENGUPTA, The Human Rights Obligations of Multilateral
Institutions and of States as Members of the MLI, in THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: OBLIGATIONS OF
STATES AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 39-40 (2003), available at
http://www.minorityrights.org/admin/Download/pdf/IPRTDSalomonSengupta.pdf (last visited Apr.
17, 2007).
20. The Secretary-General, Observance by United Nations Forces of InternationalHumanitarian
Law, UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999); See, e.g., Ray Murphy, An Assessment of UN Efforts to
Address Sexual Misconduct by PeacekeepingPersonnel, 13 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 531, 532 (2006).
21. DAVID RIEFF, A BED FOR THE NIGHT: HUMANITARIANISM IN CRISIS 308, 328 (2002).

22. Adding to the complexity is that more and more state functions, such as delivering foreign aid,
are being contracted to private entities (both for profit and non-profit). See Laura A. Dickinson,
Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability under
InternationalLaw, 47 WM & MARY L. REV. 135, 146-60 (2005).
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human suffering' and 'to protect life and health' and to ensure respect for human
beings and given without discrimination. 23
Although the ICJ did not find the US intervention in Nicaragua to have a
humanitarian purpose, its tautological statement that humanitarian aid cannot be
regarded as contrary to international law is consistent with the mystique that has
developed around humanitarian purpose. Humanitarian intention is now used
instrumentally by governments and NGOs as a means to avoid seriously evaluating
whether their intervention actually contributes to measurably improving the human
rights situation. If the intervention can be classified as having a humanitarian
purpose, intervening states can avoid scrutiny. The question should be not whether
there is a humanitarian purpose, but whether interventions have a measurable
impact on human rights.
Within many international NGOs, there has been a reaction and soulsearching whether good intentions are good enough.24 There has not been a
similar process for states and international organizations.
Scholars of
humanitarianism have discussed the need for human rights to be respected and
promoted by NGOs.25
The reality that international interventions have become a major industry
needs to be considered. The fact that public monies fuel this industry is not a
reason to avoid scrutiny, but rather a reason for it. If one was to sum all the entities
which contribute to work that may fall into the vaguely worded humanitarian
purpose, the amount would be significant.26
The international intervention industry offers goods and services and should
be treated like any other industry. Having good intentions should not free the
industry from human rights obligations. The public policy behind holding those
who manufacture goods or provide services responsible for their quality applies to
all actors, including those with the ostensible intention to do good.
The fact that governments have long history of making laws and not applying
those laws domestically simply highlights the historical challenge, but it does not
negate the importance of forcing governments to accept their legal obligations.
B. The Essence ofHuman Rights Law
The preamble of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
asserts that "the essential rights of man are not derived from him being a national
of a particular state, but are based upon attributes of his human personality. 27
23. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 242-243 (June 27).
24. See generally MARY B. ANDERSON, Do No HARM: How AID CAN SUPPORT PEACE OR WAR
(1999); Hugo Slim, Doing the Right Thing: ReliefAgencies, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Responsibility
in PoliticalEmergenciesand War, 21 DISASTERS 244, 244 (1997).
25. Hugo Slim, Not Philanthropy But Rights: The Proper Politicisation of Humanitarian
Philosophy in War, 6 INT'L. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 8 (2002).
26. For example, all the foreign aid budgets, the budgets of international organizations (e.g. UN,
WB), even some parts of defense budgets designated for this purpose, as well as NGOs and private
foundations for this purpose.
27. O.A.S. Res. XXX, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-
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States during the Vienna Conference declared, "Human rights and
fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings; their protection and
promotion is the first responsibility of Governments. 28 What is noteworthy in this
language is that it reiterates attachment of rights to the individual and the use of the
plural form of government, inferring that more than one government can be
concerned with the rights of a particular individual.
But for years there has been theoretical debate and practical confusion about
human rights. To some degree, growing out of the state-centric reality of
international law, it is understandable how many attempted to limit human rights to
being a matter between a citizen and his or her state of citizenship. Being about
the individual without a link to a particular state seems fanciful, but if the objective
of law is the protection of the individual and creation of a just world, that is the
logical outcome.29
If entities with the capacity to effect positive changes in human rights are not
bound by human rights principles, this reinforces the idea that human rights law
has no restraining normative content and may be manipulated simply for political
ends. 30 The more often human rights law is applied to those with the power to
comply with those obligations, the closer we are to a place where the individual
person, not states, forms the essence of the law.31
It has been a time-honored practice to ridicule the fact that human rights law
and international law in general are violated and to question their validity based on
this fact. For example, in Candide Voltaire mocks:
He passed over heaps of dead and dying, and first reached a
neighboring village; it was in cinders, it was an Abare village which the
Bulgarians had burnt according to the laws of war.32
The fact that all laws are broken, however, does not mean there is no lawbut it does affect the law's acceptance and effective enforcement. What is most
problematic, however, is the relative difficulty of getting the most powerful entities
actually to accept and comply with their human rights obligations. While lack of
mechanisms, effective forums and third party oversight do not negate the existence
of rights, it certainly makes our job as human rights advocates challenging.

American System, OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4 Rev. 9 (2003); 43 AJIL Supp. 133 (1949).
28. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme
ofAction, I(l),
U.N. Doc A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993).
29. In many ways this is already a well established principle, for example, "Aliens shall enjoy, in
accordance with domestic law and subject to the relevant international obligation of the State in which
they are present ...." Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the
Country in which They Live, G.A. Res. 40/144, Art.5, Annex, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doe.
A/40/53 (Dec. 13 1985).
30. MARTn KOSKENNIEMI, APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ARGUMENT 251-54 (2005)
31. JANNE ELISABETH NuMAN, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY:
INQUIRY INTO THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 457-73 (2004).

32. VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE (Boni & Liveright, Inc. 1918) (1759).
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Western tradition related to rights seems grounded in a tight knit community
or nation, where a contract between governed and governors defines these rights.
This idea, in times of little movement between one nation and another, worked
adequately enough to ground human rights law. But today, human rights law is
about protecting individuals from those who have the capacity to respect or violate
their rights. 33 The "community" is heterogeneous and international, and therefore
laws ought to apply globally. Indeed, in 1993, the Vienna Conference affirmed the
idea that human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated,
yet we have not achieved full acceptance of human rights as a constant limitation
of power.
[Tihe contracting states do not have any interests of their own; they
merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the
accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d'etre of
the convention... The high ideals which inspired the Convention
provide, by virtue of the common
will of the parties, the foundation and
34
measure of all its provisions.
Historically, human rights law has been viewed too narrowly and has been
portrayed as a dichotomy based on intentions, good or evil. In fact, because
human rights apply to everyone, not only people with evil intentions can violate
them. Often organizations created to do good, such as the UN, NGOs and even
human rights groups, can violate an individual's human rights. The idea that
violators must be evil limits the understanding and application of human rights.35
C. Human Rights Law has Both Criminaland Civil Aspects
It is important to be reminded of the criminal and civil aspects of human
rights law in order to highlight that it is very common in both these areas of law to
have multiple actors held responsible for actions that took place in another country.
A human rights violation can constitute a violation of both criminal and civil
law. In many legal systems cases based on one set of circumstances will include
both civil (e.g. monetary damages against individuals, corporate or government
entities) and criminal aspects (e.g. jail time for individuals, usually working in
some official capacity). For example, in the United States, the same violation may
trigger two different actions, one using the criminal justice system and the other
civil. On the international level, the same violation may also be treated in two
ways. Actions to regional bodies are similar to civil actions, given monetary
damages and orders to change practice will be the frequent remedy. For certain
33. See, e.g., Alon Harel, How (and Whether) to Rethink Human Rights, 9 INT'L LEGAL THEORY

87, 88 (2003).
34. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
1951 I.C.J. 3, 23 (May 28).
35. David Kennedy, The InternationalHuman Rights Movement: Part of the Problem? 15 HARv.
HUM. RTS. J. 101, 109, 111 (2002). One should question the effectiveness of international interventions
and of the overriding usefulness of the dominant paradigm, given the world should be better off then we
are. Review Essay Symposium: Phillip Allott's Eunomia and Health of Nations - Thinking Another
World: 'This Cannot Be How the World Was Meant to Be' Discussion, 16 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 255, 256,
260 (2005).
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enumerated human rights violations, an action can be brought to the International
Criminal Court.
Jurisdiction in criminal law can be asserted where the crime occurred, based
on nationality (of defendant or victim), universal jurisdiction (certain enumerated
crimes, for example crimes against humanity) or by treaty. 36 In civil law,
jurisdiction has been easier to obtain and is often asserted through minimum
contacts that do not offend notions of fair play. 37
Many theories regarding accountability of multiple actors have been
developed and are in use throughout the world. Most of these theories allow for
degrees of responsibility or fault, distinguishing the actions of one wrongdoer from
another involved in the same action. Theories and practice, ranging from simple to
very sophisticated, have developed to allocate or apportion fault, responsibility and
liability, which include: co-defendant and co-conspirator liability, agency, contract,
vicarious liability, respondeat superior, market share liability, joint and several
liability, enterprise liability and comparative fault.38
D. Jurisdiction in Human Rights Law
Unfortunately, human rights and humanitarian law are often lumped together
within the public international law field. Practitioners often practice both, and
human rights lawyers are far from immune from the phobia that human rights law
may be more fantasy than fact. Because humanitarian law is the more developed
discipline, practitioners often wrongly borrow its obsession with a threshold
jurisdictional hurdle, when no such hurdle need be crossed in human rights law.
This desire to first determine if human rights law applies has created a problem for
its extraterritorial application; such a hurdle should not have been created in the
first place.
Human rights is distinct from most international law or law between nations.
For example, whether refugee law is a distinct discipline within international law,
or rather a part of human rights law, makes a difference as to how these laws are
interpreted. Laws relating to refugee rights use language about such laws applying
in the territory of the Contracting State.39 The territorial limits included in the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees have been interpreted narrowly by
Contracting States.
For example, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a narrow

36. See, e.g., Tarik Abdel-Monem, How Far do the Lawless Areas of Europe Extend?
ExtraterritorialApplications of the European Convention on Human Rights, 14 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 159, 173 (2005).
37. This jurisdiction must "not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l
Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
38. See generally KENNETH ABRAHAM, CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (2000); CONTRACT
LAW TODAY: ANGLO-FRENCH COMPARISONS (Donald Harris & Denis Tallon eds.,1989); EUROPEAN
GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW (Springer-Verlag/Wien 2005); EUROPEAN
PRODUCT LIABILITY (Rebecca Attree & Patrick Kelly eds., 1992); FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL.,THE LAW
OF TORTS (2005); William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the Emerging Managed Health Care
System, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (1997).
39. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees art. 10, 40, Jul. 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6577, 189
U.N.T.S. 150.
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interpretation of refugee law as traditional international law, as opposed to a part of
human rights law, found that detention of Haitians in Guantanamo, Cuba, was not
covered by the Refugee Convention, since that would be an "uncontemplated"
extraterritorial obligation.4 ° Viewing the Refugee Convention as protecting the
human rights of individuals first, rather than as simply an agreement between
states, would have resulted in a different decision that protected the rights of the
refuge-seeking Haitians.4 1
Again, human rights law focuses on the rights of individuals and the core
protection or essence of the law is to protect people.
Human rights law is not humanitarian law, with all its jurisdictional
definitions. Humanitarian lawyers spend countless hours in mental contortions
attempting to either show how humanitarian law applies or does not apply to a
particular circumstance. 42 Is it an international conflict? Where the participants
engaged in combat? Were they wearing uniforms? And recently, is he or she an
enemy combatant? Such a practice appears to help these lawyers comfort
themselves that humanitarian law is really law.
Human rights apply and belong to humans. Although this may be a stark and
sweeping statement, this is the nature of the law, and this is why human rights law
now applies to non-state actors,43 to corporations and in the private sphere (e.g.,
discrimination).44 It is out of step with these developments, which represent the
essence of human rights law, to limit the extraterritorial application of human
rights law and to presume that only one state may be held responsible for violating
an individual's rights. To some degree these limits have been based on the desire
to avoid the difficult task of evaluating government policy in a war abroad. In
addition, the international law state-based approach appears to limit the inquiry to
one state at a time. In the main, though, limitations are due to an enculturation
from humanitarian law/traditional international law, where we review the actions
of one state at time and where some sort of jurisdictional hurdle must be crossed
before the law applies. Human rights law is relevant when an individual's rights
are violated.

40. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2564 (1993) cited in Gerald Neuman,
ExtraterritorialViolations of Human Rights by the United States, 9 AM UNIV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 213,
219(1993).
41. Gerald Neuman, ExtraterritorialViolations of Human Rights by the United States, 9 AM
UNIV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 213, 219 (1993).
42. A clear example of this is US government lawyer efforts to show that somehow humanitarian
law does not apply to its war on terror. For an effective critique of this mental yoga see Human Rights
Watch, Briefing Paper, InternationalHumanitarianLaw Issues In A Potential War In Iraq (Feb. 20,
2003), available at http://www.hrw.orgibackgrounder/arms/iraq0202003.htm (last visited Jan 30, 2007).
43. Nigel S. Rodley, Can Armed Opposition Groups Violate Human Rights? in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 297 (Kathleen E. Mahoney et al. eds., 1993).
44. See, e.g., ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE (1996); Mark Gibney
& R. David Emerick, The ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Law and the Protection of
Human Rights: Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable to Domestic and International
Standards, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 123 (1996); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human
Rights: A Theory ofLegal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001).
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E. Duty to Act
General principles of tort, contract and criminal law create a number of
situations requiring an affirmative duty to act, including: A duty to act may be
based in the relationship of the parties (e.g. parent to child, pilot to passenger) or in
contract; a duty based in a voluntary assumption of care; a duty arising from the
fact that a person created a risk from which a need for protection arose (e.g., the
Good Samaritan principle, where no duty exists to intervene, but once a person
intervenes she has a duty to intervene appropriately); a duty arising from a special
relationship that makes the non-acting partner criminally responsible for the actor's
criminal action (e.g. one person beats the other and leaves the victim lying on the
ground injured); a duty can arise from the fact that one owns the real property upon
which the victim is injured; the duty to act and the resulting criminal liability for
failing to act, based upon statute.45
Borrowing and applying these general principles of law to instances of states
intervening in another state in any way (from invasion, to peacekeeping, to
development work), a duty would often exist.
Perhaps the strongest basis to assert a duty is the Good Samaritan principle,
given states would argue that they had no duty in the first place to intervene. Just
as in general principles of law, a Good Samaritan has no obligation to intervene,
but if he or she does, he or she is held to certain legal obligations.
Another basis for an affirmative duty could be asserted depending on the
circumstance. For example, considering Chapter IX of the UN Charter and various
human rights agreements,46 it could be argued that a contractual or statutory duty
exists. Or where a state has intervened in another country, for example militarily
or economically, and damage has been done, a duty could arise.
The idea is established rhetorically and intellectually that a human rights duty
applies to protect the "target beneficiaries" of international actors involved in
development projects. This understanding, however, has yet to be accepted and/or
operationalized by most states and other international actors. It is notable that on
paper the World Bank already recognizes this:
Human rights foster accountability of all actors involved in
development by locating duty for particular development outcomes on
duty-bearers (usually States). This advances accountability to the poor
and a consequent empowerment of the poor. In short, human rights
improve the processes through which development occurs for those it is
47
designed to benefit.

45. See, e.g., David C. Biggs, The Good Samaritan is Packing: An Overview of the Broadened
Duty to Aid your Fellowman, with the Modern Desire to Possess Concealed Weapons, 1997 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 225, 229-230 (1997).

46. U.N. Charter art. 55-60.
47. Robert Danino, Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the Work of the World Bank, para. 2
(Jan. 27, 2006) (on file with the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy).
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F. An Agent or Sub-contractorCannot Avoid Legal Obligations
In general principles of law, it is clear, whether that under contract, agency or
tort law, that an individual or entity cannot escape legal responsibility by forming
an association with others. In these cases, one is held to be liable for the acts or
omissions of the other.
Similarly, international organizations have human rights obligations, and
entities that created these organizations do not escape liability by acting through
the international organization:
International organizations are entities created by states delegating
power to achieve certain goals and perform specified functions.... It
would be surprising if states could perform actions collectively through
international organizations that states could not lawfully do
individually. 4

[I]ntemational organizations are subjects of international law and, as
such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general
rules of international law.49
Case law interpreting the European Convention of Human Rights has
consistently held states to be responsible for their actions, regardless of the banner
or entity through which such actions were carried out. 50 For example, it would be
incompatible with the purposes of the European Convention to absolve states from
responsibility when acting through international organizations.5 1
IV. SPECIFIC HURDLES
Ending obligations to respect human rights at a nation's borders severely
limits human rights law's capacity to effectuate positive change.
This
interpretation is anachronistic and flows against an actual trend of globalization of
commerce as well as conflicts. Our present world is amazingly interconnected.
Corporations have obligations to respect human rights wherever they operate; so
how, when human rights principles apply in the private sphere across borders, can
countries claims that only a host state has human rights obligations, and that
human rights obligations that apply domestically do not apply when that country is
working in another, either directly or through an agent (e.g., UN, OAS
or World
53
Bank)?5 2 Some aspects of this issue have received academic attention.

48. Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 273, 309 (2002); see also Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11).
49. Interpretation of the Agreement of March 25, 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt, 1980 I.C.J.

73, 89 (Dec. 20).
50. Michael Kearney, ExtraterritorialJurisdictionof the European Convention on Human Rights,

5 TRINITY C.L. REV. 126, 139 (2002).
51. Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 261, 262 (1999).
52. For example, both home and host states have an obligation to regulate multinational
corporations. See, e.g., Shelton, supra note 48. It is a general principle that those with power must be

accountable for the way in which they exercise it. International organizations have developed limited
and limiting ways to hold themselves to account. See, e.g., Daniel D. Bradlow, Private Complainants
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There is a growing understanding of the application of human rights law to
individuals serving in international operations. For instance, human rights
principles proscribe "blue helmets" from torturing or raping those they have been
sent to protect. 54 At the same time, mechanisms to create accountability for these
violations are underdeveloped. 55
An understanding of how human rights law should be considered in how
Member States organize their interventions in another country and how human
rights law provides a vehicle for accountability related to money spent is also
underdeveloped and requires further attention. 6 It should be noted that Zanmi
Lasante/Partners in Health, the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human
Rights, and the International Human Rights Clinic at the New York University
School of Law requested and received a hearing on the human rights obligations,
specifically economic and social rights, members of the OAS have when
implementing projects in Haiti. 57 The purpose of the hearing was to remind the
Commissioners of the confusion regarding this issue and the ripeness for further
clarification.
A. ExtraterritorialApplication of Human Rights Law
Extraterritorial responsibility has been well established in international law
for decades. The seminal case, the Trail Smelter Arbitration, held that: "no state
has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause
injury.., in or to the territory of another" (emphasis added).58
Do these principles also apply to human rights violations arising from
decisions taken in one country that result in actions carried out in another? A

and InternationalOrganizations:a ComparativeStudy of the Independent Inspection Mechanisms in
InternationalFinancialInstitutions,36 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 403 (2005).
53. Professor Ved Nanda has been sitting on a Committee of the International Law Association
that has been grappling with this topic already for a number of years and has already caught the wave in
a recently published article. See Ved Nanda, Accountability of International Organizations- Some
Observations,33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 379 (2005).
54. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 20, at 531-46.
55. Some scholars see a more gradual acceptance by the UN and Member States of their human
rights obligations, for example when acting as a quasi-sovereign. See, e.g., Frederic Megret and Florian
Hoffmann, The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the United Nations Changing
Human Rights Responsibilities,25 HuM. RTS. Q. 314 (2003).
56. Some scholars believe the general principles of state responsibility apply to human rights law
and that the host state would be justified in approaching the intervening state for compensation for the
violation of the rights of its citizens. The logical extension of this argument is that Haiti could bring a
case in the ICJ against various states for violating the economic and social rights of its citizens. See,
e.g., Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, The Doctrine of State Responsibility as a PotentialMeans of Holding
PrivateActors Accountable for Human Rights, 5 MELB. J. INT'L L. 1, 26-27 (2004).
57. Statement of Partnersin Health/Zanmi Lasante before the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (March 3, 2006), available at
http://www.rfkmemorial.org/humanrights/2002_Loune/PIHStatement.pdf
58. The Smelter Arbitral Tribunal Decision, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684, 684 (1941), quoted in
Rebecca M. Bratspies, Trail Smelter's (Semi)PrecautionaryLegacy (2006), in REBECCA M. BRATSPIES,
TRANSBOUNDARY HARMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER
ARBITRATION, (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell Miller, eds., Cambridge University Press 2006).
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number of forums and scholars have argued that this should be the case. Many
scholars argue that decisions against the extraterritorial application of human rights
law is anathema to the effective protection of individual rights, the very purpose of
human rights law.5 9
Notably, states actually take interest in the impact of their corporate actors
abroad (e.g., product liability) 60 or acts of individuals (e.g., pedophiles, money
launderers, tax dodgers) and international humanitarian law attaches to the actor,
not the place. 6' Yet, human rights NGOs and advocacy groups have not spent a lot
of time looking at the extraterritorial impact of state actions. One author has said,
"[g]reater commitment is needed to the complex and broad-ranging business of
transforming the political culture both nationally and internationally in order to
create greater
transparency and accountability in relation to state actions
62
overseas."
The human rights advocate's position, and one that has significant theoretical
support, is that it is unconscionable to interpret human rights treaty obligations in
such a way that would permit the violation of human rights by a Contracting Party
extraterritorially, but find that same violation condemnable when done in its own
territory. 63

59. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, Extraterritorialityof Human Rights Treaties, AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 82
(1995). See also John Creone, Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict
Kosovo, EUR. J. INT'L L. 469, 475 (2001).
60. In fact, some have argued that various states, including the US, have gone too far in asserting
extraterritorial jurisdiction or application of their laws in other countries. (This is a far cry from the US
position on the application of human rights to their actions extraterritorially.) See, e.g., Note,
ExtraterritorialApplication of the Export Administration Act of 1979 Under International and
American Law, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1308, 1309 (1983); see also Jerry W. Cain, Jr., Extraterritorial
Application of the United States' Trade Embargo Against Cuba: The United Nations General
Assembly's Callfor an End to the U.S. Trade Embargo, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 379, 380 (1994);
see generally Note, Constitutional Law - ExtraterritorialApplication of the Fourth Amendment to
Actions Taken by or at the Direction of United States Agents Against Aliens Residing in Foreign
Nations, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 1473, 1479 (1974-1975) and Randall L. Sarosdy, Comment, Jurisdiction
FollowingIllegal ExtraterritorialSeizure: InternationalHuman Rights Obligations as an Alternative to
ConstitutionalStalemate, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1439, 1468 (1975-1976) (discussing the ebb and flow of the
extraterritorial application of the individual rights guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution); see also Angela
Fisher & Margaret Satterthwaite, Beyond Guantanamo: Transfers to Torture One Year After Rasul v.
Bush, CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, June 28, 2005, available at
http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/Beyond%20Guantanamo%20Report%20FINAL.pdf (providing a more
recent example of the ebb and flow of the extraterritorial application of the individual rights guaranteed
in the U.S. Constitution).
61. See, e.g., Dino Kritsiotis, The Kosovo Crisis and NATO's Application of Armed Forces
Against the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 330 (2000).
62. Ralph Wilde, Legal "Black Hole"? ExtraterritorialState Action and InternationalTreaty Law
on Civil and PoliticalRights, MICH. J. INT'L L. 739, 770 (2005).
63. Michael Kearney, ExtraterritorialJurisdictionof the European Convention on Human Rights,
5 TRINITY C. L. REv. 126, 126-129 (2002).
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The issue has been litigated often in the European Court on Human Rights.
on the definition of "jurisdiction" found in article 1 of the
These cases turn mainly
64
European Convention.
There have been many critiques of the European Court's approach to
extraterritorial application of the Convention, a number of which show what
appears to be somewhat inconsistent judgments that tend to support the idea that
the Court has placed the higher interests of the State Parties above examining
serious human rights violations. 65 Cases against Turkey and Russia have tended to
support the extraterritorial application, while cases against core European states do
not.66
In the context of the Turkish occupation of Cyprus, the Court stated: "[A]
Contracting State to the Convention could not, by way of delegation of powers to a
subordinate and unlawful administration, avoid its responsibility for breaches of
the Convention, indeed of international law in general. 67
The term 'jurisdiction' is not limited to the national territory of the High
Contracting Parties; their responsibility can be involved because of acts of their
authorities producing effects outside their own territory.65
One line of cases clearly does not limit jurisdiction to territorial boundaries
and uses the "effective control" or "degree of control" test based on power or
authority to determine if the European Convention should be applied
extraterritorially. 69
In the Bankovic case, plaintiffs attempted to hold states responsible for a
bombing in Belgrade by NATO forces, but the Court narrowed the applicability of
the Convention extraterritorially to the territories of the Contracting States. By
taking this tack, the Court avoided the more interesting question regarding the
degree State Parties are responsible for actions carried out within the framework of
NATO. 0
...
[T]he Convention is a multi-lateral treaty operating, subject to Article
56 of the Convention, in an essentially regional context and notably in

64. "The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention." Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
65. See, e.g., Kearney, supra note 63 at 126-157 (providing an analysis of several decisions of the
European Court regarding the extraterritorial application of international human rights laws).
66. Some scholars have pointed to the odd development of jurisprudence in this area as related to
Europe's colonial past. Louise Moor & A.W. Brian Simpson, Ghosts of Colonialism in the European
Convention on Human Rights, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 121 (2005).
67. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 71 (May 10, 2001).
68. Drozd & Janousek v. France & Spain, 240 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 91 (1992); See also
Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 62 (1995).
69. See Cyprus v. Turkey supra note 69 at 71; Loizidou v. Turkey supra note 68 at 62; Ocalan v.
Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003); Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2004); Ilascu v. Moldova & Russia, App. No. 48787/99, Eur. Ct. H.R (2004).
70. See, e.g., Alexandra Ruth & Mirja Trilsch, International Decision: Bankovic v. Belgium
(Admissibility), 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 168, 172 (2003).
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the legal space (espacejuridique)of the Contracting States. The FRY
clearly does not fall within this legal space. The Convention was not
designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect of the
conduct of Contracting States. Accordingly, the desirability of avoiding
a gap or vacuum in human rights protection has so far been relied on by
the Court in favour of establishing jurisdiction only when the territory
in question was one that, but for the specific circumstances, would
normally be covered by the Convention.71
Although this reading of the European Convention moves away from
extraterritorial application, the "espace juridique" concept would reinforce the
notion that regional human rights instruments apply throughout the territories of
the Contracting States. Taking this line of thinking a logical step further, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) were designed to
apply throughout the world, so it is not a stretch to define "espacejuridique"to be
global.72

In matters related to extraterritorial application of the American Convention
on Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission has taken a position that is
conceptually consistent with the essence of human rights law. It has held: "[g]iven
that individual rights inhere simply by virtue of a person's humanity, each
American state is obliged to uphold the protected rights of any person subject to its
jurisdiction., 73 This appears to mean that all OAS Members are bound by InterAmerican human rights law when intervening in Haiti.
The Inter-American Commission for Human Rights has also specified the
non-nationality basis for conceiving human rights. 74 If human rights law cannot
support a distinction between nationals and foreigners domestically, should it be
able to do so extra-territorially?
Perhaps most important for the purposes of this article, the "jurisdiction"
limitation that exists in the European Convention, the ICCRP and the American
Convention on Human Rights is conspicuously absent in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Article 2 begins:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and co-operation,
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available
71. Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333 para 80 (Dec. 12,
2001).
72. It should be noted that the Human Rights Committee has not been so expansive in its view of
extraterritorial application. In its General Comment 31 on Article 2 it stated, "that a State Party must
respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control
of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party." U.N. Human Rights
Comm., General Comment No. 31 [80]: The Nature of the GeneralLegal Obligation Imposed on State
Partiesto the Covenant, 10, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26,2004).
73. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951 Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. 37 (1999).
74. Wilde, supra note 62, at 791.

DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 35:3/4

resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of
the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means,
75
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
It should be noted that only article 14 of the ICESCR specifies that each State
Party must have a plan for securing free primary education in its territory or under
its jurisdiction. Otherwise, the ICESCR requires international cooperation to
achieve the rights of the Convention in all State Parties.
The Committee on Economic and Social Rights clarifies this point:
The Committee wishes to emphasize that in accordance with Articles 55
and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, with well-established
principles of international law, and with the provisions of the Covenant
itself, international cooperation for development and thus for the
realization of economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of all
States. It is particularly incumbent upon those States which are in a
position to assist others in this regard. 76
This certainly can be read as an attempt to create an obligation to provide
foreign assistance, but it also supports the idea that if a state or states choose to
intervene in another nation, the intervening states continue to be bound by the
Covenant. In another General Comment, the Committee mandates that the rights
of Covenant be considered by State Parties in their international work. These
statements underscore the applicability of the ICESCR extraterritorially:
The second principle of general relevance is that development
cooperation activities do not automatically contribute to the promotion
of respect for economic, social and cultural rights. Many activities
undertaken in the name of "development" have subsequently been
recognized as ill-conceived and even counter-productive in human
rights terms. In order to reduce the incidence of such problems, the
whole range of issues dealt with in the Covenant should, wherever
77
possible and appropriate, be given specific and careful consideration.
Every effort should be made, at each phase of a development project, to
ensure that the rights contained in the Covenants are duly taken into
account. This would apply, for example, in the initial assessment of the
priority needs of a particular country, in the identification of particular
projects, in project design, in the implementation of the project, and in
78
its final evaluation.

75. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2, Dec. 19, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
76. U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights [CESCR], General Comment 3: The Nature of
States PartiesObligations (Art. 2, par.1 of the Covenant), 14, U.N. Doc. 14/12/90 (Dec. 14, 1990).
77. U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights [CESCR], GeneralComment 2: International
TechnicalAssistanceMeasures (Art. 22 of the Covenant), 7, U.N. Doc. 02/02/90 (Feb. 2, 1990).
78. Id. at 8(d).
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The extraterritorial application of Contracting Parties obligations under the
Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is much clearer than that under
the European Convention and the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights and clearer than the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.
B. MarginalizationofEconomic and Social Rights
Economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) have been marginalized in
practice. 79 Many governments and a number of leading NGOs see economic rights
more as the equivalent of letters to Santa Claus rather than as justiciable rights. 8 °
A few states, like the US, still cling to the outdated notion that human rights are
limited to civil and political rights. 81 But we in the advocacy community also are
part of the problem.82 Our focus on civil and political rights has helped to
marginalize ESCR. Importantly, violations of ESCR affect women
disproportionately since women 83tend to be marginalized in terms of political
power, there may be a correlation.
Up to now, most discussions (both academic and in the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR)) of the extraterritorial application of human rights law have related to
civil and political rights. The marginalization of ESCR can be seen from this fact,
especially considering the distinct wording between the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which favors the extraterritorial application
of ESCR rights.
Many countries, like Canada and Brazil, have developed very sophisticated
ways of measuring positive change in the level of respect for ESCR. 84 When
intervening abroad, these countries should bring this experience with them in order
79. Human rights as implemented today can mask power relations. While economic and social
rights have been marginalized, market attributes have been formalized through the WTO. See Tony
Evans, InternationalHuman Rights Law as Power/Knowledge, 27 HUM RTS. Q. 1046 (2005).
80. "Right to Health," 6 Human Rights Features 1 (31 March - 1 April, 2003). For an alternative
view of the justiciable nature of economic, social and cultural rights, see Trinidad Antonio Cancado, "A
Justicabilidade dos Direitos Economicos, Socias e Culturias no Plano Internacional," in Volio Jimenez
Collection 171 (2002) (on file with author).
81. Rhoda Howard, The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority Over Civil and
PoliticalRights? Evidencefrom Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 467, 468 (1983).
82. See Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and CulturalRights: PracticalIssues Faced
by an InternationalHuman Rights Organization,26 HUM. RTS. Q. 63 (2004); Leonard S. Rubenstein,
How InternationalHuman Rights OrganizationsCan Advance Economic, Social and CulturalRights: A
Response to Kenneth Roth, 26 HUM. RTs. Q. 4 (2004).
83. See Joe Oloka-Onyango, Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalization:
InternationalMechanisms, Non-State Actors, and the Strugglefor People's Rights in Africa, 18 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 851, 876-79 (2002-2003).

84. See, e.g., Todd Landman, MeasuringHuman Rights: Principle, Practiceand Policy, 26 HUM.
RTS. Q. 906 (Nov. 4, 2004); Katarina Tomasevski, Measuring Compliance with Human Rights
Obligations, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC LAW AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE POLICIES OF THE
NORDIC COUNTRIES, 109 (1989); Robert E. Robertson, Measuring State Compliance with the

Obligation to Devote the "Maximum Available Resources" to Realizing Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 693 (1994).
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to demonstrate whether money being spent is actually improving the human rights
situation. 85
There is a growing understanding of the many ways of viewing and working
internationally. But too often when viewing human rights problems, we borrow
only from the criminal aspect of the law and forget about its social justice
component, and thereby fail to include a focus on the obligations to improve the
economic, social and cultural reality of the people in the country where the
international entities are intervening.
Often, for example, in the field of
transitional justice, economic, social and cultural rights are marginalized.86
Peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts are lagging well behind in terms of
measuring their impact on ESCR. Whereas human rights are normally included in
the report of the Secretary General to the Security Council related to a specific
peacekeeping operation, these reports almost always focus on civil and political
rights and contain minimal if any discussion of ESCR.
C. Multi-StateResponsibility
Roman law offers one of the first examples of how a legal system is renovated
under the influence of equitable ideas. 87 It is time for our thinking about multistate responsibility for violations of economic and social human rights to be
renovated.
In general principles of law, for example, we find co-defendants and coconspirators in criminal law, and joint enterprises and joint enterprise liability in
civil law. 8 Many actors (e.g., States, multilateral organizations and NGOs) are
part of the joint enterprise of bringing sustainable peace and the respect of the full
spectrum of human rights to Haiti. There should be shared responsibility and
accountability. 89 Not only general principles
of law, but general principles of
90
international law support this position.
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has already held that
if states fail to abide by their obligations in the Covenant when entering bilateral or
multilateral agreements they can violate their obligations under the Covenant. 91 It

85. Tools have been created that are useful in determining if a state is taking steps to the
maximum of its available resources. See, e.g., Claudio Schuftan, Dignity Counts: A Guide to Using
Budget Analysis to Advance Human Rights, 27 HUm. RTS. Q. 134 (2005).
86. Louise Arbour, United Nations High Comm'r for Human Rights, Economic and Social Justice
for Societies in Transition (Oct. 25, 2006), available at http://www.ictj.org/en/news/features/1025.htm.
87. Schermaier, supra note 1 at 65.
88. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95
MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1266-1380 (1996-97).
89. More has been written on obligations of UN and multilateral entities than holding multiple
states responsible for the same violation; however, more work is needed to flush out how states must
abide by their human rights obligations while acting collectively. See, e.g., Cerone, supra note 59;
Kritsiotis, supra note 61.
90. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 15 (Jan. 29).
See, e.g., Salomon and Sengupta, supranote 19.
91. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights [CESCR], General Comment 14, The Right to the
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is a logical step to consider states bound by the Covenant in the implementation of
these agreements. States are individually and collectively bound by human rights
law. The question remains as to how to achieve acceptance of this principle. In
the case of "decisions... made collectively, one cannot disaggregate such actions
and attribute them to individual member States. Member States are then obliged to
discharge their obligations undertaken qua members pursuant to those collective
decisions,92and will be held... responsible under international law for the breach
thereof."

Despite some developments, human rights law and accountability for
violations still have not evolved to hold multiple actors liable. We are very much
still in the state-citizen mode in terms of the application of human rights law. This
is true despite the fact that the reality on the ground is complex, multidimensional
and involves many actors. In places like Haiti, where the government was not
trusted or had a limited capacity to absorb funds from international donors, a
different way of looking at human rights obligations needs to be developed.
Importantly, in Haiti, most money flows from a donor directly to NGOs or
corporations (implementing projects approved by the donor), but yet the
government of Haiti is held responsible for improving the human rights situation
and is accountable for whether these projects - which the Government has very
little influence over - actually benefit the people. Something is wrong with this
picture: the UN peacekeeping mission to Haiti, the OAS mission, the InterAmerican Development Bank, World Bank and all the Member States' missions
and projects to Haiti, NGOs and corporations, are all exponentially better
resourced than the Government.
Numerous entities exercise some power and impact the lives of Haitians. In
multiple ways, the relative power of each entity should be examined when
determining levels of responsibility to respect and promote the human rights of the
Haitians. Interestingly, all of those entities, except corporations, would accept that
one of their missions is to improve the human rights situation in Haiti. The
problem is that the expectation and measurement of each entity's contribution to
improving the human rights situation remains undeveloped. All accountability still
flows to the entity considered by many to be corrupt and ineffective - the Haitian
government-while the Member States and their agents enjoy moral high ground
and no accountability. Even "do gooders" need to examine carefully to see if their
work is actually producing 93a human rights benefit, including the human rights
components of UN mission.

Highest Attainable Standardof Health, 50, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000); Comm. on Econ., Soc.
and Cultural Rights [CESCR], General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food, 19, U.N. Doc.
E/C. 12/1999/5 (1999).
92. U.N. ECON. & SOC. COUNCIL [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Prot. of Human
Rights, Progress Report: Globalization and Its Impact on the FullEnjoyment of Human Rights, 58,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10 (Aug. 2, 2001) (preparedby Joseph Oloka-Onyango and Deepika
Udagama).
93. Kennedy, supranote 35, at 108.
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Even if huge projects could not be completed within the next few years, many
projects could be implemented that would help transform lives and give the Haitian
people some control and influence over the resources being spent in their name.
This, in and of itself, is mandated by human rights law. Political participation in
the decisions affecting the Haitian people is fundamental in human rights law.
Why it can be ignored at a time of crisis is far from clear, especially when it is the
people's participation and empowerment that can help to build the basis for a
sustainable peace through laying the foundation for good governance.
It is not simply the international intervenors' responsibility; obviously the
host Member State has significant obligations, but it is past due to begin a process
to define that each intervenor has human rights obligations and those obligations
need to be considered in the way interventions are structured and their impact
measured.
Rights also have addressees who are assigned duties or responsibilities. A
person's human rights are not primarily rights against the United Nations or other
international bodies; they primarily impose obligations on the government of the
country in which the person resides or is located. The human rights of citizens of
Belgium are mainly addressed to the Belgian government. International agencies,
and the governments of countries other than one's own, are secondary or "backup"
addressees. International human rights organizations provide encouragement,
assistance, and
sometimes criticism to states in order to assist them in fulfilling
94
their duties.
A growing acceptance of the responsibility to protect highlights the
significance of "backup" responsibility: the principle makes it an obligation of UN
Member States to intervene to end massive human rights violations. 95
Contemporary practice makes it hard to see how states other than the primary
state have duties in a Hohfeldian sense, but such practice is out of step with other
areas of law that clearly contemplate multiple duty holders. There is nothing in
human rights law that prevents us from using a similar analysis. In fact, the call
for state cooperation to achieve full respect for human rights seems to highlight the
duty. "Starting with a human act, we must next find a causal relation between the
act and the harmful result; for in our law - and it is believed in any civilized law liability
cannot be imputed to a man unless it is in some degree a result of his
6
act."

9

The main hurdle is the means for moving from a lack of an obligation to
intervene in another country, for example, when the responsibility to protect does
not exist and the recognition of a duty on states that voluntarily intervene in
another country. In this case, we can simply borrow from the general principles of
94. James Nickel, Human Rights, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Fall 2006,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/ (emphasis excluded).
95. See, e.g., Mukesh Kapila, United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan, The
Responsibility to Protect: Moving from Words to Action (Jan. 25, 2006), available at
http://www.aegistrust.org/index.php ?option=comcontent&task=view&id=318 &Itemid = 147.
96. Joseph Beale, The Proximate Consequences ofAn Act, 33 HARV. L. REv. 633, 637 (1920).
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law. Just as in the case of the Good Samaritan, there may be no duty to intervene,
but the act of an intervention, or voluntary operation in another state, creates legal
duties to respect human rights law.
Once we get over the duty hurdle, it is also not clear what standard should be
applied. Until now, states could point to their good intentions as a reason why they
should not be held responsible. However, given that mens rea or bad intention is
only required in some cases of criminal law, other standards need to be looked at,
such as recklessness, negligence and strict liability. In many ways a violation of
human rights law is a malum prohibitum or a prohibited wrong. When such a
wrong happens the parties involved are liable. This should be the case in human
rights law.
Once a violation of human rights can be demonstrated, liability and
responsibility should be divided based on relative power and ability to have ended
the violation.
V. RECOMMENDATION/CONCLUSION

Recently, member states of the UN, including most notably the United States,
have been preoccupied with the concept of the UN's accountability. But what is
needed is accountability to the UN's guiding principles rather than to the agenda of
particular Member States.
Further defining the extent of states' human rights obligations when
intervening in other states will help to improve transparency, accountability and
effectiveness of these interventions. It is hoped this article will create more
interest in this area.
The IACHR examination of multi-state responsibility for extraterritorial
violations of economic, social and cultural rights of Organization of American
States Member States is an important step in the direction of formalizing a new
understanding of what human rights duties are held by states voluntarily
intervening in other state. Hopefully, the IACHR will help clarify the legal
obligations that do in fact exist.
Once there is a growing understanding of this responsibility, the heavy lifting
will be the operationalization of this obligation when Member States and their
agents (e.g., UN and World Bank) operate in another country.

